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MILLER v. McKENNA [23 C.2d 
Court of Appeal erroneously cited the Clay case as authority, 
the conclusion that, without an order of court, a party may 
not recover for the services of a person who testified as an 
expert, was correct. 
Because the trial court made no order appointing as an ex-
pert anyone of the four persons for whom compensation is 
claimed by Mr. and Mrs. Holmes, there can be no recovery for 
amounts paid or incurred as the expense of expert witnesses. 
But the appellants are entitled to recover the reasonable value, 
of services rendered to them in preparing for trial, including 
the expenses of the persons performing such services. 
As to the items charged for the compensation and expense 
of experts in connection with their appearance and testimony 
upon the trial of the action, the order is affirmed; as to the 
items charged for the compensation and expenses of the 
named experts out of court, the order is reversed, with direc-
tions to determine what amounts, if any, were necessarily 
incurred in preparing for trial, and to tax costs accordingly. 
The appellant shall recover costs upon this appeal. 
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Curtis, J., Carter, J., Traynor, J., 
and Schauer, J., concurred. 
[L. A. No. 18157. In Bank. Mar. 20, 1944.J 
EDWIN J. MILLER, Appellant, v. CATHERINE A. 
McKENNA et aI., Defendants; DANIEL B. FLENNER 
et aI., Respondents. 
[1] Taxation-Tax Deeds-Curative Acts.-The curative provi-
sions of the 1929 amendment to Pol. Code, § 3764, appear 
to have been concerned only with the pUblication of delin-
quent lists or notices of sale "to enter taxes, penalties and 
costs as separate entries but entering the foregoing amounts 
in one total sum," and with notices of sales and tax deeds 
[1] See 24 Cal.Jur. 372. 
McK. Dig. References: [1,15] Taxation, § 347; [2,4, 13,14] 
Taxation, § 31; [3,5-7] Statutes, § 10; [8,9] Constitutional Law, 
§ 124; [10] Constitutional Law, § 118; [11] Mortgages, § 441; 
[12] Mortgages, § 545 j Taxation, § 31. 
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based on such entries. The 1929 enactment had no effect 
on tax deeds issued' pursuant to notices of sale which were 
fatally defective for omitting the word "penalty" in stating 
the amount due. 
[2] ld. - Curative Legislation.-The Legislature has general 
power to enact statutes to validate prior tax proceedings. 
[8] Statutes-Curative Acts.-A proper validating act', may be 
effective as to pending litigation. . .. , 
[4] Taxation-Curative Legislation.-The fact that a prior t~x 
proceeding was fatally defective is not alone an in.surmoun~ 
able obstacle to the legislative exercise of the curative power. 
[5] Statutes-Curative Acts.-The Legislature may cure irregu: 
·larities or omissions to comply with provisions of a statute 
which c~uld have been omitted in the first. instance. 
r6] ld.-Curative Acts.-The Legislature cannot' cure defects 
which are jurisdictional. However, the manner of procedure, 
after jurisdiction is acquired and t~e .mandate~ of .due 'proc~ 
ess are complied with, are matters wlthlD th.e leglslatlve dlsc.re-
tion and may be subjected to .the. exerc~se . o~. the heahng 
power so long as further constitutional mhlbltIons are ob-
served. 
[7] ld.-Curative Acts.-The Legislature may not enact curative 
legislation the effect of which would be to destroy or unlaw-
fully infringe upon vested rights. 
[8] Constitutional Law-Retrospective Laws-Vested Rights.-
A vested right, as that term is used in relation to constitu-
tional guaranties, implies an interest which i~ is proper. ~or 
the state to recognize and protect, and of WhlCh the mdlVld-
ual may not be deprived arbitrarily without injustice. 
[9] ld.-Retrospective Laws-Vested Rights.-The question of 
what constitutes a vested right is confided to the courts. 
[10] ld.-Fundamental Rights-Right ~f Property.-T~e right of 
acquiring, possessing and protectmg property ~les at the 
foundation of our constitutional government, and IS necessary 
to the existence of civil liberty and free institutions. 
[11] Mortgages - Foreclosure - Judgments-Conclusiveness.-In 
an action to quiet title, the validity of a mortgage, the fore-
c!t:\.'!ure of which. was the basis of plaintiff's title, could not 
be questioned. 
[12] ld.-Foreclosure-Rights of Purchaser-When Title Passes: 
Taxation-Curative Legislation.-By a sheriff's deed executed 
in pursuance of a mortgage foreclosure judgment and sale, 
the mortgagee's equitable estate was converted into a legal 
[8] See 5 Cal.Jur. 747; 11 Am.Jur. 1197 •. 
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estate, which became a property right vested in the purchaser; 
and where such right vested prior to the passage of the tax 
curative act of 1943 (Stats. 1943, p. 1993), he may not be 
divested of such right except in a manner provided by law. 
[13] Taxation-Curative Legislation-Curative Act of 1943.-To 
the extent that the tax curative act of 1943, § 2(a), limits 
the operation of the act to the correction of "defects, irregu-
larities and ministerial errors which the Legislature originally 
could have omitted," the curative provisions of the act, 
within the constitutional limitations, would be effective. 
[14] ld.-Curative Legislation.-The Legislature may cure all 
defects in the taxing process not violative of constitutional 
rights. 
[15] ld.-Tax Deeds-Curative Acts.-In a controversy involv-
ing conflicting claims to title to real property arising under 
plaintiff's deed on mortgage foreclosure on the one hand and 
defendants' tax deeds on the other, the curative act of 1943 
was inapplicable to validate void tax deeds executed pursu-
ant to prior invalid tax sales, where plaintiff's property in-
terest vested in him prior to the passage of said curative act, 
and where its application to him under the circumstances 
of the case would deprive him of his estate without due 
process of law. 
APPEAL from part of a judgment of the Superior Court 
of Los Angeles County. Charles S. Burnell, Judge. Reversed. 
Action to quiet title. Portion of judgment awarding de-
fendants title to part of property sued for, reversed. 
Edwin J. Miller, in pro. per., and Ralph W.Miller for 
Appellant. 
W. Verne Ahrens, Ernest M. Best, Ratzer & Bridge and 
Glenn A. Lane for Respondents. 
Robert W. Kenny, Attorney General, H. H. Linney, Assis-
tant Attorney General, Adrian A. Kragen and John L. 
Nourse, Deputies Attorney General, J. H. O'Connor, County 
Counsel, and A. Curtis Smith, Deputy County Counsel, as 
Amici Curiae on behalf of Respondents. 
SHENK, J.-The plaintiff sued to quiet title to 103 lots 
in the city of IJoR Angeles. His title is based on a sheriff's 
deed executed in pursuance of a mortgage foreclosure judg-
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ment and sale. The defendants' claims of title depend upon 
the validity of certain tax deeds. The plaintiff recovered 
judgment quieting his title to all but ten of the lots. He 
appealed from that portion of the judgment quieting in the 
defendants the title to those ten lots. 
Nine of the ten lots involved on the appeal were sold to the 
state in 1912 for delinquent 1911 taxes. In 1917 they were 
sold by the state at public sale to the highest bidders. The 
tenth lot was sold to the state in 1918 for delinquent 1917 
taxes, and in 1923 was sold by the state. 
The plaintiff claimed through a mortgage executed in 1915 
and Ii. sheriff's deed on foreclosure executed and recorded in 
1937. The mortgage contained a waiver of the statute of 
limitations, and the validity of the mortgage and foreclosure 
was decreed in Dexter v. Pierson, 214 Cal. 247 [4 P.2d 932], 
and Busing v. Pierson, 1 Cal.2d 495 [36 P.2d 116]. 
By findings and judgment dated March 20, 1941, the trial 
court found and concluded that the publications of the 1911 
and 1917 deliquent tax lists involving the ten lots were not in 
accordance witp, the statute and that the tax sales and tax 
deeds issued pursuant thereto were invalid. The court held 
that the notices of sale in 1911 and 1917 were fatally defec-
tive and therefore invalid for the reason that they omitted 
the word "penalties" in stating the amount due. In so hold-
ing the court was fortified by many cases in this court and 
the District Courts of Appeal directly in point. The case 
which may be deemed the leading case on the subject is 
Bussenius v. Warden, 71 Cal.App. 717 [236 P. 371] (1925), 
wherein it was held that a sale pursuant to a notice which, 
as here, omitted the word "penalties" in stating the amount 
due, was void. The same notice there and here involved wail 
held to be void in Snodgrass v. Errengy, 86 CaLApp.·664 
[261 P. 497] (1927). In Wyser v. Truitt, 95 Ca1.App.727 
[273 P. 147] (1928), a similar notice was held insufficient to 
support a tax deed. The holding in Bussenius v. Warden was 
approved by this court in January 1929, in Knolie,v; Knight, 
206 Cal. 225 [273 P. 786]. Again in Gramson;'v. Geniella, 
209 Cal. 610 [289 P. 817] (1930), this court'llpprovedtiie 
holding. To the same effect are Redman v. Newell; ;11'4> Cal. 
App. 215 [299 P. 746J (1931); Myran v. Smith, 117 CaLApp. 
355 [4P.2d 219] (1931); Rexon v. Gaffey, 119'CatApp>389 
[6 P.2d 534] (1931); Langstaff v. Mitchell, 119,~CaL.App~407 
[6 P.2d 546] (1931); Ayars v. Faust, 131 CaI.App.154'[20 
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P.2d 963] (1933); Trozera v. McDonell, 131 Cal.App. 473 
[21 P.2d 706] (1933), and Jones v. Walker, 47 Cal.App.2d 
566 [118 P.2d 299] (1941). . 
In Bray v. Jones, 20 Cal.2d 858 [129 P.2d 364].(1942), .thl,S 
court again recognized the correctness of the prIor holdmgs 
by saying at page 862: "The failure to set fort~ the amo?nt 
due for penalties, emphasized by the state~ents. m ~he ~otlCes 
that penalties were not included, was plamly m vIOlatIOn of 
the statute as it then read." . . 
Thus prior to the entry of judgment herem m .1941 the 
subject had been exhausted by the nu~ero~s holdmgs that 
the notices of sale here involved were mvalId and that any 
tax deed issued thereunder was necessarily void. Ho:we~er 
the trial court further found and concluded that a ratIfymg 
statute adopted in 1929 was intended to and had the .e~ect 
of curing the defects in those insti'uments. The origmal 
briefs on appeal (filed before the enactment ~f an?ther. c:ura-
tive act in 1943, which will be discussed later m .th~ opmlOn) 
were devoted principally to the effect of the ratIfymg statute 
of 1929 the enactment. of which appears to ~ave been occa-
sioned by the decision of this court in Gottste~n v. Kelly, 206 
Cal. 742 [276 P. 347]. . 
At the time of the publication of the 1911 and 1917 ~e~m-
uent tax lists and until 1929, section 3764 of, ~he ~ohtIcal 
60de provided that the tax collector ~hould publIsh the 
delinquent [tax] list, which must contam t~e names of the 
persons and a description of the propertr, delmq.uent, and the 
amount of taxes, penalties and costs. due Oppo~Ite each name 
and description. In March 1929 thIS court declded the Go~t-
t . In that case certain tax deeds wcre held VOId s em case. . t 
because the published delinquent tax hst stated one a~oun 
opposite descriptions of several parcels of pro~erty m one 
h· (to designate the total of taxes, penaltIes and costs owners Ip . . ' db 'd 
on all of such parcels), instead of statmg, as reqUIre y S~I 
section 3764, the amount of taxes, penalties and costs OppOSIte 
the description of each parcel. It ~as also held that the 
notice of sale was not in accordance wlth the statute a~d was 
defective in that it did not state the amounts due f?~ taxes, 
penalties, and costs" as required by the statute, CItmg Bus-
senius v. Warden, supra.. . 
Following the decision in the Gottstein case, the ~egislature 
amended section 3764 of the Political Code, effectIve o~ the 
23rd of the following May, to provide that ~he publI~~ed 
delinquent list should contain, among other reqUIrements, an 
Mar. 1944] MILLER v. McKENNA 
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amount equal to the total amount of all taxes,' assessments, 
penalties, and costs due." By a separate section of the act 
the Legislature declared that the amendment was "not a 
change in, but a statement and declaratory of the law as the 
Legislature intended it to be by the terms" of said'section 
3764 prior to amendment. It was further declared that. iU~ 
publications of delinquent lists "faili~g to,enter t~xes, penal; 
ties and costs as separate entries but entering ,the"foregoing 
amounts in one total sum and all sales;' certificateS 'of /!ale',Ja~ 
deeds or other tax conveyances based'~upo~ su.cli'eritries' O;rl 
any assessment roll or delinquent' list' are hereby" confii.riied: 
validated and legalized, and the same snall be construed and' 
operate at all times and upon all occasio:h.s in law in the same 
manner IlB if such entries were separatelysetfor;th , .,." 
Following the declaration of the immediate effect of the act 
was a statement of the facts constituting the 'nece~sity there-, 
for, as follows: "Due to the recent decision of the supreme 
court of the State of California in the case of Gottstein v. 
Kelly," the "possible construction" to be placed upon the 
pertinent requirements would be that taxes, penalties, and 
costs should be separately shown on the publication of delin~ 
quent lists and notices of sale; that" inasmuch as the tax col~: 
lectors of the state have completed preparatory. work on the', 
pUblication of the delinquent list which mus(bepublished 
on or before June 8, 1929, and great expense' would be in-
volved in the publication of the delinquent list 1;0 state as 
separate items the amount of taxes, penalties iUld costs du~ 
on property subject to tax sales and the possibility 'of error 
would be greatly increased, many tax titles acquired at tax' 
sales would be jeopardized." . 
A casual reading of the opinion in the Gottstein case might 
afford some justification for the apprehension of the Legis-
lature, but a more careful study of it reveals that in no sense 
was it intended to be, nor could it properly be, an adjudica-
tion that a separate amount for each of the items of taxes, 
penalties and costs must be stated in the notice of sale. That 
question was not involved in the casco Its solution, as appre- . 
hended by the Legislature to be a "possible construction" of 
the statute by this court, would have been obiter and would 
have been unsupported by any decision in this state. [1] It 
is conclusively shown by the language used in the 1929 act 
amending section 3764, that the Legislature did not intend 
to change the law so as to conform to the apprehended "pos- ' 
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sible construction," but merely to declare, out of an abun-
dance of caution, that the amendment did not work a change 
in the pre-existing law but was a continuation thereof. With 
this declaration we cannot be at odds for no case has been 
found in this state, either before or since the amendment of 
1929 which held that a separate statement of the amount of 
each' of the items of taxes, penalties and costs was essential 
to a valid notice of sale. 
The curative provisions of the 1929 act appear to have 
been concerned only with the pUblication of delinquent lists 
or notices of sale which failed "to enter taxes, penalties and 
costs as separate entries but entering the foregoing amounts 
in one total sum," and with notices of sales and tax deeds 
based upon such entries. It may not be assumed. that the 
Legislature thereby intended or attempted to valIdate tax 
deeds which were void for reasons not contemplated by. the 
terms of the act. The 1929 enactment therefore had no effect 
upon the tax deeds here in question. 
Pending this appeal and after the argument in the case 
the Legislature in 1943 adopted another curative act which 
it is claimed is much broader than the act of 1929 and has the 
effect of resuscitating the void tax deeds here involved and 
thus confirming title in the tax deed holders. The submis-
sion of the cause on appeal was set aside in order that the 
attorney general might file a brief as amicus curiae in sup-
port of the effectiveness of the 1943 act as a cure of the defects 
in the tax proceedings here under review. The recent enact-
ment is chapter 458 of the Statutes of 1943. (Stats. 1943, 
p. 1993.) It became effective on August 4th and provides: 
"Section 1. Every act and proceeding heretofore taken by 
any county, city and county or the officers thereof relative to 
the preparation, transmitting, computing, determining or 
fixing the budget or the tax rate or rates of any county or 
city and county, or to the assessment or equalization of prop-
erty or to the levy of taxes thereon or to tax sales or certifi-
cates of tax sales, tax deeds or other conveyances resulting 
from such assessment, equalization and levy, are hereby con-
firmed, validated and declared legally effective. 
"Sec. 2 (a) This act is limited to the correction of defects, 
irregularities and ministerial errors which the Legislature 
originally could have omitted from the statutory requirements 
of law under which the acts hereby confirmed, validated and 
declared legally effective were taken. 
Mar. 1944] MILLER 'V. McKENNA 
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"(b) This act is limited to the validation of acts and pro-
ceedings to the extent to which the same can be effectuated 
under the State and Federal Constitutions. 
"Sec. 3. If any provision of this act or its application to 
any person or circumstanceR is held invaliJ., the remainder 
of the act and the application of its proviSiOns to other per-
sons or circumstances is not affected;" 
The question then to be determined is whether the act of 
1943 may be deemed to cure the defects in the prior invalid 
tax sales and thereby to validate a void tax deed executed 
pursuant thereto, under the facts here disclosed. 
[2] No doubt may be entertained of the general power 
of the Legislature to enact statutes to validate llrior tax pro-
ceedings. Many cases recognize that power. (Moore v. Patch, 
12 Cal. 265; Oowell v. Doub, 12 Cal. 273; People v. Holladay, 
25 Cal. 300· Wetherbee v. Dunn, 32 Cal. 106, 108 j People v. 
McOreery,34 Cal. 432; People v. Goldtree, 44 Cal. 323; Rollins 
v. Wright, 93 Cal. 395 [29 P. 58] ; Haaren v. High, 97 Cal. 
445 [32 P. 518]; Ramish v. Hartwell, 126 Cal. 443 [58 P. 
920]; Ohase v. Trout, 146 Cal. 350 [80 P. 81] j Baird v. 
Monroe, 150 Cal. 560 [89 P. 352] j Oarter v. Osborn, 150 Cal. 
620 [89 P. 608]; Peck v. Fox, 1~4 ~al. 7~4 [99 P. 189]; 
Imperial Land 00. v. Imperial Irngatwn D~st., 173 Cal. 660 
[161 P. 113]; Schamblin v. Means, 6 Cal.App. 261 [91 P. 
1020] ; Oity of Santa Monica v. Los Angeles Oounty, 15 Cal. 
App. 710 [115 P. 945] ; Stuart v. Oh~pman, 87 Cal.App. 552, 
553 [262 P. 348].) [3] And a proper validating ac~ ~ay 
be effective as to pending litigation. (Cooley, Const. LImIta-
tions, 8th ed.; p. 787; United States v. Heinszen &; 00., 206 
U.S. 370, 387 [27 S.Ot. 742, 51 L.Ed. 1098] ; see, also, Tulare 
Irr. Dist. v. Superior Oourt, 197 Cal. 649 [242 P. 725] ; Olark 
v. Oity of Los Angeles, 160 Cal. 30, 43 [116 P. 722].) 
[4] The fact that the proceeding was fatally.defective is not 
alone an insurmountable obstacle to the exerCISe of the cura-
tive power' for as said in People v. Holladay, supra, at page 
305 if it ~as ~ot fatally defective it would stand in no need 
of the healing power. But there are certain limitations, on 
the exercise of that power. Included therein are the inhibi-
tions of the federal and state Constitutions. The permissible 
exercise of the power and the limitations thereon ar~set forth 
generally in Ohase v. 'Trout, 146 Cal. 350 [80. P.· 81], and 
similar cases, and may be summarized as follows: . . 
[5] The Legislature may cure irregularities oroinissions 
782 MILLER v. McKENNA [23 C.2d 
to comply with provisions of a statute which could have been 
omitted in the first instance. This rule is quoted from Cooley 
on Constitutional Limitations, at page 457, as follows: "If 
the thing wanted or failed to be done, and which con~titutes 
the defect in the proceedings, is something the necessIty ~or 
which the leO'islature might have dispensed with by prIor 
statute then 'it is not beyond the power of the legislature to dispe~e with it by subsequent statute; and if the irregu-
larity consists in doing some act, or in the manner or mode 
of doing some act, and which the legislature might have made 
immaterial by prior law, it is equally competent to ma~e the 
same immaterial by a subsequent law." (Gordon v. O~ty of 
San Diego, 101 Cal. 522, 528 [36 P. 18, 40 Am.St.Rep. 73] ; 
Cooley's Constitutional Limitations, 8th ed., pp. 775-776.) 
[6] But the Legislature cannot cure defects which are some-
times termed jurisdictional. Among the jurisdictional requi-
sites are (a) a duly constituted taxing authority; (b) prop-
erty to be taxed within the territorial jurisdiction of .the 
taxing body; (c) property or subject matter legally ~ubJect 
to the tax; and (d) sufficient notice and opportumty for 
hearing to constitute compliance with due process. (See 
Graham & Foster v. Goodcell, 282 U.S. 409 [51 S.Ot.186. 
75 L.Ed. 415] ; Swayne & Hoyt, Ltd. v. United States, 300 
U.S. 297 [57 S.Ot. 478, 81 L.Ed. 659] ; People v. Goldtree, 44 
Cal. 323; People v. Lynch, 51 Cal. 15 [21 Am.Rep. 677]; 
Harper v. Rowe, 53 Cal. 233; Baird v. Monroe, 150 Cal. 560 
[89 P. 352] ; People v. Van Nuys Lig~ting Dist., 173 Cal. 792 
[162 P. 97, Ann.Cas. 1918 D 255] ; Fall River Valley IrrigQ.-
tion Dist. v. Mt. Shasta Power Oorp., 202 Cal. 56 [259 P. 444, 
56 A.L.R. 264]; Golden Gate Bridge etc. Dist. v. Felt, 214 
Cal. 308 323 [5 P.2d 585] ; Texas 00. v. Bank of America etc. 
Assn., 5' Ca1.2d 35, 43 [53 P.2d 127] ; Hall v. Fairchild-Gil-
more-Wilton 00., 66 Cal.App. 615 [227 P. 649] ; 6 R.C.L. 321; 
24 Cal.Jur. 30 et seq.) While the Legislature cannot cure 
the omission of jurisdictional requisites, the manner of 
procedure, after jurisdiction is acquired and the mandates 
of due process are complied with, are matters within the legis-
lative discretion and may be subjected to the exercise of the 
healing power so long as further constitutional inhibitions are 
observed. 
[7] The Legislature may not enact curative legislation the 
effect of which would be to destroy or unlawfully infringe 
upon vested rights. In such cases laws confessedly retrospec-
Mar. 1944J MILLER v. McKENNA 
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tive have been declared ineffective when they were held to be 
in conflict with some right secured either by a constitutional 
guaranty or protected by the principles or universal justice. 
(Galland v. Lewis, 26 Cal. 46, 47,49, citing Terrett v. Taylor, 
9 Cranch (U.S.) 43 [3 L.Ed. 650]; Oity of Los Angeles v. 
Oliver, 102 Cal.App. 299, 310 [283 P. 298] j 5 Cal.Jur. 747.) 
[8] As said in City of Los Angeles v. Oliver, supra, at page 
310, citing 6 R.C.L. 308, and Oampbell v. Holt, 115 U.S. 620 
[6 S.Ct. 209, 29 L.Ed. 483], a vested.right, as that term is 
used in relation to constitutional guaranties, implies an in-
terest which it is proper for the state to recognize and pro-
tect, and of which the individual may not' be deprived arbi-
trarily without injustice. [9] The question of what constitutes, 
such a right is confided to the courts. In Glide v. Superior 
Oourt, 147 Cal. 21, at page 30 [81 P. 225], itwassa.idj,through 
Mr. Chief Justice Beatty, concurring, that'vested rights of 
property and contract rights are placed by the Constitution 
under the protection of the courts, where alone the questions 
of law and fact upon which they depend can be finally 
decided. That declaration was quoted with approval by this 
court in lnglin v. Hoppin, 156 Cal. 483, 488 [105 P •. 582]. 
[10] When the power of the. court is invoked to protect 
the right, the inquiry may be "Whether, in the case pre-
sented, the effect of applying the statute is to deprive . the 
party of his property without due process of law'! (Ohase ,y. 
Trout, supra, at p. 359). For example "the Legislature. has 
no power to take the property of one person .and give it to 
another." (Gillan v. Hutchi.nson, 16 Cal. 153, 156.) The 
right of "acquiring, possessing and protecting property'~.'is 
anchored in the first section of the first article of our Consti- . 
tution. This right is as old as Magna Charta. It lies at the 
foundation of our constitutional government, and "is neces-
sary to the existence of civil liberty and free institutions;'.' 
(Billings v. Hall, 7 Cal. 1, 6.) 
[11] As to the plaintiff's property right in the present 
case it was stipulated that his common source of title was in 
Edward Russek. In 1915 the Pierson.'>, husband and wife, pur-
chased the property and executed to Russek a purchase money 
mortgage including therein the parcels involved in this action. 
The validity of the mortgage, the foreclosure of which is the 
basis of the plaintiff's title, may not now be questioned. (Dex-
ter v. Pierson, supraj Busing v. Pierson, supra.) [12] The 
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plaintiff is the successor in interest of the mortgagee. The 
mortgagee's interest was therefore at first an equitable estate 
in the property. By the sheriff's sale and deed the equitable 
estate was converted into a legal estate which became a prop-
ertyright vested in the plaintiff in 1937, prior to the passage 
of the curative act of 1943, and of which he may not be di-
vested except in a, manner provided by law. 
[13] In the enactment of the curative act of 1943 the 
Legislature was scrupulous in observing the constitutional 
limitations on the exercise of its power. Section 2(a) limits 
the operation of the act to the correction of •• defects, irregu-
larities and ministerial errors which the Legislature originally 
could have omitted." To this extent the curative provisions of 
the act, within the constitutional limitations, unquestionably 
would be effective. [14] Then section 2(b) limits the act "to 
the validation of acts and proceedings to the extent to which 
the same can be effectuated under the State and Federal Con-
sti.tut~o~. ". The attorney general recognizes the necessity of 
thIS lImItatIOn, for the first proposition advanced by him is 
that ., The Legislature may cure all defects in the taxing 
process not violative of constitutional rights." With this 
we agree. In section 3 the Legislature further recognizes 
that the act, in "its application to any person or circum-
stances" might be held invalid, and declares that notwith-
standing that fact the act otherwise should be effective. 
[15] Weare dealing here with a controversy between pri-
vate parties concerning conflicting claims to the title to real 
property arising under separate conveyances of record the 
plaintiff's deed on foreclosure on the one hand, and th~ de-
fendants' tax deeds on the other. It has been demonstrated 
that the curative act of 1929 by its terms is inapplicable to 
this case; and to give the curative act of 1943 the effect 
claimed for it would be, "in its application to" the plaintiff 
under the ,. circumstances" of this case, to deprive him of his 
estate without due process of law and thus by a mere legisla-
tive rescript pronounce as valid a deed which was void when 
it was made (Harper v. Rowe, 53 Cal. 233, 237, 238), and 
thereby transfer the title of the plaintiff to the defendants. 
Indeed, it may be said that the application of that curative 
act in this case would be to sanction a purported judicial 
determinatio~ by the Legislature of conflicting rights in real 
property whIch that body may not constitutionally render. 
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(Roche y. Waters, 72 Md. 264 [19 A. 535, 7 L.R.A. 533~.) 
We conclude that the property interest of the plam7 
tiff is a vested right of which he was not divested by the 
general provisions of section 1 of the curative act of 1943 ~ 
that such interest was not otherwise affected by the act as 
contemplated by section 2 (b) thereof; and that this is one 
of the cases wherein the "application" of the act is ineffec-
tive as contemplated by section 3 thereof. 
From the foregoing a reversal must follow. None of. the 
parties has manifested any dissatisfaction with the finding of 
the trial court on the issues of adverse possession. The plain-
tiff was not aggrieved by the finding and the defendants were 
not aggrieved by the judgment. Therefore questions of the 
sufficiency of the evidence to support the findings on those 
issues, or the correctness of the findings and conclusions of 
the trial court thereon, are not determined. 
Other questions discussed by the parties have been con-
sidered but a specific reference to them is unnecessary~ The 
question of reimbursement if any to the tax deed purchasers 
is not involved on this appeal. . 
The portion of the judgment appealed from is reversed. 
Curtis, J., Carter, J., and Schauer, J., concurred. 
TRAYNOR, J., Dissenting.-The majority opinion fails 
to specify any statutory requirement that the notices of sale 
did not meet. It states that the trial court found the notices 
of sale fatally defective because they omitted the word "pen-
alties" in stating the amount due.' Actually, however, there 
is no finding by the trial court as to why the notices were 
invalid or in what manner they departed from the statutes 
then in effect. 
If any irregularity exists it is essential that it be identified.. 
If there was no departure from the statutory requirements 
the tax deeds are valid; if there was, it is necessary to deter-
mine whether it was of a kind that could be remedied under 
the curative act of 1943. The statutes governing the publi-
cation of the delinquent lists are sections 3764 and 3765 of 
the Political Code. 
The Requirements of Section 3764 Were FUlly Met. 
Section 3764 as it read in 1912 and 1918, when the lists 
were published, provided that at certain prescribed times the 
,:\ ';, ; i
I ' 
'I 
'I 
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tax collector "must publish the delinquent list, which must 
contain the names of the persons and a description of the 
property delinquent, and the amount of taxes, penalties, and 
costs due, opposite each name and description." The delin-
quent lists in the present case were published at the pre-
scribed times and contained the names of the persons and a 
description of the property followed by a figure representing 
the amount due, as required by section 3764. The plaintiff 
made no attempt to prove that this figure did not correctly 
represent the total amount of taxes, penalties, and costs due. 
Since presumably pUblic officials follow the law and perform 
their duties properly, it must be assumed, in the absence of 
evidence to the contrary, that the figure opposite each de-
scription represented such amount. (Code Civ. Proc., sec. 
1963(15); Bray v. Jones, 20 Cal.2d 858, 860 [129 P.2d 364J.) 
Moreover, at the times of the execution of the deeds in ques-
tion Political Code section 3786 provided: "Such deed, duly 
acknowledged or proved, is primary evidence that ... (5) At 
a proper time and place the property was sold as prescribed 
by law, and by the proper officer; ... ," and Political Code 
section 3787 provided: •• Such deed, duly acknowledged or 
proved is (except as against, actual fraud) conclusive evi-
dence of the regularity of all other proceedings, from the 
assessment by the assessor, inclusive, up to the execution of 
the deed." It should be noted that while the delinquent list 
must contain the amount of taxes, penalties, and costs, there 
is no requirement that it state that it does so. The require-
ments of section 3764 were the't'efore fully met. 
The Requirements of SectilJn 3765 Were Fully Met. 
Section 3765, as it read when the lists were published, pro-
vided: "The tax collector must append and publish with the 
delinquent list a notice that unless the taxes delinquent, to-
gether with the costs and penalties, are paid, the real prop-
erty upon which such taxes are a lien will be sold." The 
notice in the present case was phrased in substantially the 
language of that section: "Now, Therefore, I, W. C. Welch, 
Tax Collector in and for the County of Los Angeles, by vir-
tue of authority in me vested by law, hereby give public 
notice that unless the taxes delinquent as appear by said 
list, together with the costs and penalties, are paid, I as said 
Tax Collector, at the office of the County Tax Collector, in 
the City of Los Angeles, on Monday, the First Day of July, 
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, A M will sell all said real 
1912, at the h~ur of 10 0 clo~f:n t~ th'e State of California." 
estate upon whIch taxes are a th no omission of the word 
(Italics added.) There was d U:h inclusion of which was 
"penalties" or any other wor I"&.t, of such a notice was 
required by sec~ion 376~. The va 1/ y 20 Ca1.2d 858, 861 
sustained by thIS court m ~ray v. ~::;~ used applies with 
[129 P.2d 364], and the angua'~~hen as in this case, the :~~e f:t~' i:r:'':::, c:~ v" perso~ d ~:: .. ~::::,! 
a~sessed, a description ;f i~~~:~pe:;~s!'~ents, penalties and 
to the total amount 0 a , '.11 be sold unless 
costs due' and provides that the property WIt d penalties 
. t th with interes an the taxes delmquent, oge er h . ments of Political 
aid the notice conforms to t e reqUIre are p , 5 " 
Code, sections 3764 and 376 . , ': 
h 0 .. of the Word "Penalties" in a state-T e mtsswn , .b d b 
t by the Tax Collector, Not Presc~ e y ~:;ttte: Was Not Designed to Ind'tcate:: 
Exclttsion of Penalties from the A~ou~t, ~ . f th 
. ularit in the publIcation 0, e 
If there ~as ~l1Y Irreg fo~d in the violation, of some 
delinquent hsts It I?ust be the statutes of, this state. The 
principle not prescrIbed. by rd.t of the proceedings to the 
plaintiff attributes th~, mval~' 1 ~, in a notice not prescribed 
omission of the word d Pde~a ~: tax collector at the . end' of by statute but appen e. y . 
the delinquent list, readmg as follows. . ' '
"Dollars and Cents , • 
. .. b iven that the figures, appearmg 
., PublIc notIce IS here y g , 'h d' " . t' ·0' n • of prop-
. . d I t after eac e .. crlp 1" " OpposIte, followm~ an ~s t Tax List for' 1911, ,of and 
erty in the foregomg De mquen " " intended, toland' • do 
for the County ?f Lo~ Angel~~ o:e~: Cents, or in' Dollars 
represent respectIvely m Doll~ th amount due for taxes 
and Cents as the case may e, e '." ' 
.' h er as follows to-Wlt: 
and costs m t e mann fi r s ;' ear th~rein, Cents were 
"When or where two gu e PPd h' where mor,e b dare represente j w en or 
intended to e anh therein Cents were intended to than two figures t us appear "fi ,.'. ,": <fihe figures 
be and are represented by the last ~'Y0 guf ~tehs, .an t•d 'last two 
. . at the left 0 e sa . 
occupymg and apPte~rI::erefrom by a space were intended 
figures, and separa et D lIars so that the amount due for to and do represen 0 , 
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taxes and costs in the respective cases aforesaid are thus 
expressed in Dollars and Cents." 
Obviously the purpose of this statement was to explain 
that the figures represented dollars and cents, and the refer-
ence to taxes and costs was incidental to that explanation. 
It was not the purpose of this statement to set forth what 
the dollars and cents represented, and its omission of the 
word "penalties" cannot therefore be regarded as an inten-
tion to exclude penalties from the amount due. There was 
nothing misleading in the omission of the word "penalties," 
for the tax collector had not only complied fully with sec-
tions 3764 and 3765, which govern the publication of the 
delinquent lists, but he had stated clearly in the addenda 
notice published in 1917 that "no bid for said property will 
be accepted for less than the amount of all taxes, penalties 
and costs due on said property for the year same was origi-
nally struck off and sold to the state (in 1912 for taxes of 
the year 1911) which minimum amount is set forth opposite 
the description of said property." The cases relied upon 
by the plaintiff and cited in the majority opinion not only 
failed to show that the notice violated any statute, but er-
roneously assumed that the statutes required the tax collector 
to append a statement that the figur~ represented taxes, 
penalties, and costs. Since there is no su?h statutory require-
ment and no other reason appears why tbe error should ren-
der the notices invalid, these cases should b~ disapproved. 
The majority opinion quotes from Bray v . • lones, 20 Cal. 
2d 858, 862 [129 P .2d 364], as follows: "The failure to set 
forth the amount due for penalties, emphasized by the state-
ments in the notices that penalties were not included, was 
plainly in violation of the statute as it then read." This 
statement was made in distinguishing that case from what 
had commonly been understood to be the holding in Gott-
stein v. Kelly, 206 Cal. 742 [276 P. 347], that section 3764 
required taxes, assessments, penalties, ana coots to be sepa-
rately stated. It cannot be dissociated froni the sentence 
immediately preceding it: "In any event the cases relied 
upon by the defendant were concerned with section 3764 
when, as interpreted by Gottstein v. Kelly, supra, it required 
taxes, assessments, penalties, and costs to be separately 
stated. " This general understanding of the holding in the 
Gottstein case prompted the legislation in 1929 to clarify 
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the section and validate previous notices thereunder. (8tats. 
1929, p. 742) and it therefore appeared ~ne?essary ll1 Br~y 
v. Jonesto revive an issue as to the holdll1g ll1 the Gottstell1 
cas;~rther consideration of the Gottstein case discloses t~at 
it did not actually hold that taxes, assessments, penaltIes, 
and costs had to be separately stated. In that case several 
lots were separately assessed to the same person, and the no-
tice of sale was held invalid because it showed the ag~regate 
amount of taxes, penalties, and costs fot all the lots ll1ste~d 
of setting forth the proportionate amount ~hereof oppoBlte 
each description as prescribed by the sectIOn., The co~rt 
did not hold, as has been commonly assumed, that sectIon 
3764 required taxes, penalties, and costs to be sep~rately 
stated. It held that when pareels in single ownershlp are 
separately assessed, the taxes, penalties, and ~os~sdue for 
each parcel must be set forth opposite the descrIptIOn ther~of 
as provided by section 3764, so that the owner can determll1e 
the amount necessary to redeem any parcel that he may 
wish to redeem apart from the others. While the court re-
ferred to Oordano v. Kelsey, 28 Cal.App. 9 [151 P. 391, 398], 
holding that under Political Code, section 3897, as it read 
in 1911, taxes, penalties, and costs ~ust b~ separ~tely stated 
in the notice of sale under that sectIon, thIS holdll1g. ,,:as not 
made applicable to section 3764. There was no necessIty for 
such an application in view of the failure to set forth ~he 
amount due opposite each description as required by sectIon 
3764. In any event, had the Legislature intended to provide 
that taxes, penalties, and costs be se~arately st~ted It c,~uld 
have done so unequivocally. Its cholCe of the sll1gular the 
amount" of taxes, penalties, and costs plainly indicates that 
an aggregate amount was to be set forth opposite each de-
scription so that the owner would .In;tow .the amoun:t necessary 
to redeem his property. The opll110n ll1 Gottste'/,n v. Kelly 
does not point to any language in section 3764 requiring that 
these items be separately stated or attempt to show how the 
section could be construed to make such a requirement: Since 
the Gottstein case did not hold what the quotation from 
Bray v. Jones assumed it held, and the majority opiriion 
recognizes that it did not, that quotation cannot now be taken 
from its context to serve as a recognition "of the correctness 
of the prior holdings." 
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Even if the statutes governing the present case had re-
quired the tax collector to append a statement that the 
figures represented taxes, penalties, and costs, his omission 
of the word "penalties" from the statement is cured by the 
1943 act., That act cannot be held unconstitutional without 
repudiating principles that have been the established law of 
this state since its earliest days. In 1859, in Moore v. Patch, 
12 Cal. 265, involving legislation confirming a delinquent tax 
list, t~e court recognized the power of the Legislature to pass 
curatIve statutes validating proceedings in the levying and 
collecting of taxes notwithstanding irregularities therein and 
this power has been reaffirmed in many cases since that time. 
(Cowell v. Doub, 12 Cal. 273; People v. Holladay, 25 Cal. 
300, 301 ; Wetherbee v. D~£nn, 32 Cal. 106, 108; People v. 
McOreery, 34 Cal. 432; People v. Goldtree, 44 Cal. 323. 
Rollins v. Wright, 93 Cal. 395 [29 P. 58] ; Haaren v. High; 
97 Cal. 445 [32 P. 518] ; Ramish v. Hartwell, 126 Cal. 443 
[58 P. 920] ; Chase v. Trout, 146 Cal. 350 [80 P. 81] ; Baird 
v. Monroe, 150 Cal. 560 [89 P. 852] ; Carter v. Osborn, 150 
Cal. 6~0 [89 P. 608J; Peck v. Fox, 154 Cal. 744 [99 P. 189J ; Imper~al Land 00. v. Imperial Irrigation District, 173 Cal. 
660 [161 P. 113J ; Clayton v. Schultz, 4 CaL2d 425 [50 P.2d 4~6J; Schamblin v. Means, 6 Cal.App. 261 [91 P. 1020); O~ty of Santa Monica v. Los Angeles Oounty, 15 Cal.App. 
710 [115 P. 945J; Stuart v. Ohapman, 87 Cal.App. 552, 553 
[262 P. 348J.) Only those acts or omissions that the Legis-
lature is restrained by constitutional limitations from sanc-
tioning in advance, often characterized as "jurisdictional " 
cannot be validated by curative statutes. (See 24 Cal.J~r. 
8.0.) T~e confu~i?n that arose from describing as jurisdic-
tIonal, IrregularItIes that violated only material statutory 
requ~re~ents! without inquiring whether or not they were 
also In vI.olat~on of the state or federal Constitution, prompted 
~n eXamInatIOn of the whole subject in an exhaustive opin-
IOn for ~h~ cou~t by Justice Shaw in Ohase v. Trout, supra. 
That OpInIOn ~elter~ted. the rule that a curative statute may 
preclude the IDvestigatIOu of all questions except whether 
the statute if enacted in advance ,would violate the due proc-
ess clause. or other provisions of the state or federal Consti-
tution. As to all "other statutory steps or acts the same 
power which prescribes them is competent to d~clare that 
their non-observance shall not be fatal to the validity of the 
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d . th " tax and that no inquiry may be ma e concermng em. 
(Ohase v. Trout, supra, at p. 359; Swayne & Hoyt Ltd. v. 
United States, 800 U.S. 297 [57 S.Ct. 478, 81 L.Ed. 659]; 
Graham & Foster v. Goodcell, 282 U.S. 409 [51 S.Ct. 186, 75 
L.Ed. 415] ; Charlotte Harbor & N. R. Co. v. Wells, 260 U.S. 
8 [43 S.Ot. 3, 67 L.Ed. 100].) Shortly thereafter ~h~ rule 
was reaffirmed in Baird v. Monroe, supra, and the opIDlon of 
the court by Justice Angellotti distinguished Harper v. Rowe, 
53 Cal. 283 on which the majority opinion relies, on the 
ground that"'There the levy of the tax was invalid for want 
of any law authorizing it to be levied.': . . ... 
It is contended that the alleged VIOlation IS a Jurls~lc­
tional one because it prevented an effective trallsfer of tItle. 
If a defect prevents an effective transfer of title at the tax 
sale, title remains in the owner. If the defect d?es n?t pre-
vent an effective transfer of title, the tax deed IS valId and 
any discussion of curative acts becomes idle. (People v. Hol-
liday, 25 Cal. 300, 805.) The foregoin? content~on would 
apply to any violation of a statutory reqUIrement With resp?ct 
to proceedings in tax sales and would serve .to ban curative 
statutes entirely with respect to such procee~gs. By. ~u~­
ing that noncompliance with a statutorr reqUIreme~t IS JuriS-
dictional even though the requirement IS not essential to tneet 
the mandates of the state or federal Constitution, this con-
tention falls into the very error that Chase v. Trout, supra, 
sought to prevent. It is settled that the Legislature can val~ 
idate conveyances between private persons that would o:ther-
wise be ineffective to transfer title because of noncomplIance 
with statutory requirements. (Dentzel v. Waldie; 80 Cal. 138; 
Steger v. Traveling Men's Bldg. & L:"'A88n.,\~08:Il1.2~6 
[70 N.E. 236, 100 Am.St.Rep. 225]; and' cases~Mllehted, l~ 
57 A.L.R. 1197.) There is no reason'why"a'different rule 
should govern transactions in which' tnt'lstate is ,ian' inter! . 
ested party. (See Gordon v. City of San Diego,lOl Cal. 522 
[36 P. 18,40 Am.St.Rep. 73].) ,'" ., ; 
There can be no question that the Legislature could. have 
omitted at the outset any requirement as to a statement that 
the amount due includes penalties. The subject of,the tax was 
clearly within the jurisdiction of the, taxing, authorities; 
there was an assessment of 'the property and ample oppor. 
tunity for the equalization of the assessment; there was a levy 
of the tax and notice was given of the delinquency and of 
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the sale of the property; and there were liberal provisions 
for the redemption of the property. Neither the majority 
opinion nor the briefs cite any act or omission in the entire 
proceedings from the assessment of the property' to its sale 
by the state that would violate any constitutional provision 
or that could not have beE-n previously authorized by the 
Legislature. The notices of sale to the state and of the sub-
sequent sale by the state were more than sufficient to meet 
the requirements of due process of law. There is nothing in 
the due process clauses of either the state or federal Consti-
tution requiring that such notices be given in a p~ticular 
form or that a form once prescribed be adhered to meticu-
lously. Certainly neither these nOr any other constitutional 
provisions provide that the notices must contain a statement 
that the amount due includes "penalties." 
The majority opinion assumes that the mortgagor-owner 
had no rights that would prevent the application of the 
curative act but holds that since the plaintiff's rights are 
based on his title by deed at the mortgage foreclosure sale, 
they intervened between the tax deed and the curative act 
and are therefore excepted from the rule of the foregoing 
cases. A mortgagee's title, however, is no better than that 
of the owner, for the tax lien is at all times prior to the 
mortgage lien, and the mortgagee takes the property subject 
to the state's claim for taxes. (Pol. Code, sec. 3716; Oalifor-
nia Loan db Trust 00. v. Weiss, 118 Cal. 489 [50 P. 697]; 
Williams v. Oooper, 124 Cal. 666 [57 P. 577] ; German Sav-
ings db Loan Society v. Ramish, 138 Cal. 120 [69 P. 89, 70 
P. 1067]; 0 'Dea v. Mitchell, 144 Cal. 374 [77 P. 1020]; 
Guinn v. McReynolds, 177 Cal. 230 [170 P. 421]; State v. 
Royal Oonsolidated Mining 00., 187 Cal. 343 [202 P. 133].) 
The mortgages were dated May 28, 1915, which was before 
the attachment of the lien for the 1916-1917 taxes but after 
the attachment of the lien for the 1911-1912 taxes. The tax 
liens were superior to. all prior as well as all subsequent liens 
arising out of private contracts. (Ibid.) The tax deeds 
validated by the 1943 legislation are based upon the tax 
liens and are therefore superior to the claims not only of 
the former owners but of those deriving title therefrom, 
since the title of the mortgagee and of those claiming under 
him can be no better than that of his predecessors in inter-
est. (San Francisco v. Lawton, 18 Cal. 465, 474 [79 Am. 
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Dec. 187]; Branham v. Mayor a~d Oounc~'l of San Jose, ~ 
Cal. 585, 604; [[reichbaum v. Melton, 49 Cal. 50, 54; Robtn-
son v. Thornton, 102 Cal. 675, 680 [34 P. 120]; Hoppe v. 
Hoppe, 104 Cal. 94, 99 [37 P. 894]; Hodge v. Norton, 133 
Cal. 99, 100 [65 P. 123]; Freelon v. Adrian, 161 Cal. 13 
[118 P. 220]; White v. Rosenthal, 140 Cal.App. 184 [35 
P.2d 154] ; see 18 Cal.Jur. 613; Code Civ. Pro c., sec. 700.) 
Plaintiffs were not bona fide purchasers for value without 
notice of the tax liens and the proceedings for their enforce· 
ment, for they acquired the property subject to the tax li~ns 
(Pol. Code, sec. 3716; Oalifornia Loan db Trust ~o. v. WetSs, 
supra; Williams v. Oooper, supra; Ger~an Sav'/,ngs db L~an 
Society v. Ramish, supra; O'Dea v. M'ttchell, supra; Gut.nn 
v. McReynolds, supraj State v. Royal Oonsolidated Mimng 
00., supra; see, also, District Bond 00. v. Pollack,19 CaI.2d 
304, 307-308 [121 P.2d 7] and cases there cited) and are 
charged with notice of the tax proceedings, which are mat-
ters of public record. (Reeve v. Kennedy, 43 Cal. 643, 654; 
Grant v. Oornell, 147 Cal. 565, 567 [82 P. 193, 109 Am.St. 
Rep. 173]; Newcomb v. Oity of Newport Beach, 7 Cal.2d 
393 406 407 [60 P.2d 825]; In re Seick, 46 Cal.App. 363, 
369' [189 P. 314].) It must be assumed that plaintiffs were 
aware of the technicality on which their grantor's title de-
pended. No reason appears why a person thus gambling 
on the possibility that a defect in the tax proceedings may 
have established his grantor's title should not, like the 
grantor himself, be subject to the power of the s!ate to cor· 
rect the defect. 
The intricacy of the tax laws makes it inevitable that pro· 
ceedings in the levying a:r;td collecting of taxes should con· 
stantly fall short of perfection. If they succ~ed in ac?o~. 
plishing faithfully the objectives .. of the Leglslature: It IS 
captious to condemn them for fallIng to cross the T s of a 
detail not essential to those objectives, and doubly so to reo 
ject a curative statute of the Legislature that would avert 
serious consequences of an inconsequential error in an other~ 
wise correct notice. Insistence upon an impossible perfec-
tion can only lead to wholesale invalidation of tax titles in 
Los Angeles County where notices like that in the present 
case were used for many years. One may well ask to what 
end, since the needless discouragement of the purchase of 
property at tax sales only serves to keep such property off 
• 
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the tax rolls and to increase the tax burden on other prop-
erty with the net effect of penalizing property owners who 
pay their taxes. 
Gibson, C. J., and Edmonds, J., concurred. 
Appellant's and respondents' petitions for a rehearing were 
denied April 18, 1944. Gibson, C. J., Edmonds, J., and Tray-
nor, J., voted for a rehearing. 
[L. A. No. 18816. In Bank. Mar. 2l, 1944.] 
RALPH P. GAGE, Petitioner, v. FRANK M. JORDAN, as 
Secretary of State, etc., et al., Respondents; RETIRE-
MENT LIFE PAYMENTS ASSOCIATION, INC. (a 
Corporation) et al., Interveners. 
[1] Statutes - Enactment - Initiative: Construction - Liberal 
Construction-Initiative Statutes.-All doubt as to the con-
struction of pertinent provisions relating to an initiative 
measure is to be resolved in its favor, and such legislation 
is to be given the same liberal construction as that afforded 
election statutes generally. 
[2] Constitutional Law-Construction of Constitutions-Intent 
of Framers: Statutes-Construction-Giving Effect to Leg-
islative Intent.-Where the language of a constitutional or 
~ta.tutory provision is susceptible of more than one meaning, 
It IS the duty of the courts to accept that intended by the 
framers of the legislation, so far as such intent can be ascer-
tained. . 
[3] Statutes-Construction-Circumstances Indicating Legisla-
tive Intent.-The purpose and object sought to be accomplished 
by legislation are of prime importance in ascertaining the 
legislative intent. 
[1] See 23 Cal.Jur. 675; 28 Am .• Tur. 153. 
. McB:. "Dig. References: [1] Statutes, §§69, 205; [2] Constitu-
tlO~al Law, §25; Statutes, §114; [a] Statutes, §124j [4] Consti-
tutIOnal Law, §167; Statutes, §167; [5J Elections, §146(3); [6-10J 
Statutes, §69. 
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[4] 
[5] 
[6] 
[7] 
[8] 
[9] 
Constitutional Law-Construction of Constitutions-Absurd-
ity: Statutes-Construction-Absurdity.-Where -the language 
of a constitutional or a statutory provision is fairly susceptible 
of two constructions, one of which, in application, will render 
it reasonable, fair and harmonious with its manifest purpose, 
and another which would be productive of· absurd conse-
quences, the former construction will be adopted. 
Elections-Mandamus-Duties Enforceable-Preparation of 
Ballot.-Mandamus is the proper remedy to compel the Sec-
retary of State and a county registrar of voters to omit from 
any future ballot an initiative measure which once failed to 
qualify for want of sufficient signatures. 
Statutes-Enactment-Initiative-Construction of Constitu-
tional Provisions.-Const., art. IV, §1, when read in its en-
tirety and in connection" with statutes enacted pursuant there-
to, connotes an intention that insufficient initiative petitions 
shall lapse and become functus officio; that is, it enforces a 
time limitation running from the "last preceding general elec-
tion" to the "next succeeding general election occurring to 
130 days after the presentation aforesaid of said petition." 
Id.-Enactment-Initiative-Construction of Constitutional 
Provisions.-Inasmuch as under Const., art. IV, §1, the pro-
cess of circulating initiative petitions must be completed 
within a designated time, at the expiration of which it be-
comes the ministerial function of the Secretary of State 
"forthwith" to certify the measure for the ballot if it has suf-
ficient qualified signatures, the reasonable construction of said 
section is that if the measure does not qualify, the entire pro-
cedure must be instituted anew. 
Id.-Enactment-:-Initiative-Construction of Constitutional 
Provisions.-That part of Const., art. IV, §1, which declares 
that if any initiative measure be not submitted "at. the elec-
tion specified in this section," such failur~ shall not preve!1~ 
its submission at a succeeding general election, supports" tli& 
construction that a petition which failsto'qualifyfor",th-e" ba:l~ 
lot does not remain effective indefinitely thereafter, as it is 
only in case of the stated exception that a measure may go 
on "the ballot at an election later :than the: "succeeding general 
election." ,., 
Id.-Enactment-Initiative-Construction of Constitutional· 
Provisions.-Those portion~ of Const., art. IV, §1, whichpr~ 
scribe the manner in which signatures to an initiative petiti~n 
are to be affixed and dated support the conclusion· that the 
[4) See 23 Cal.Jur. 766; 25 R.C.L. 1019. 
